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Abstract - We analyze the behavior of state revenues since the early 
1950s to determine the severity of the revenue declines experienced 
by states after the 2001 recession. Both total state revenues for the 
nation and state–level data for each state are studied. We conclude 
that the states were indeed hit with an unprecedented downturn 
in revenues—unlike anything that had been experienced in the 
preceding half–century. Further and contrary to general percep-
tions, revenue increases in the years preceding the downturn were 
not particularly strong compared to revenue increases in the years 
leading up to previous recessions. We further conclude that most 
proposed budget rules dealing with either taxes, spending, or sav-
ings would have been insufﬁcient to address the states’ problems 
and that states will need major discretionary structural changes in 
state revenues and expenditures to return to ﬁscal balance. 
INTRODUCTION
Is the state budget crisis that had its origins in the eco-nomic expansion of the late 1990s and the recession that 
began in 2001 sui generis or simply a variant of recent state 
budget cycles? This is a key issue in assessing blame, if 
any, for the state budget crises and in planning to improve 
state decisionmaking. The most important issue is whether 
appropriate budget rules could have eliminated or at least 
ameliorated much of the pain that states suffered from the 
economic downturn.
In its impact on state revenues and in the disconnect 
with economic conditions, the current state budget cycle of 
expanding revenues followed by precipitous declines may 
be a one–of–a–kind phenomenon, the proverbial hundred 
year ﬂood or perfect storm, that is extremely unlikely to oc-
cur again. Alternatively, the cycle may simply be a different 
version of past cycles that might have been foreseen and 
responded to better with fuller understanding.
In this paper, we review and analyze the behavior of state 
revenues since the early 1950s—a period that includes nine 
recessions as determined by the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research. In the ﬁrst section of the paper, we conduct 
an analysis of aggregate state–level data over the last half 
century. We follow this section with a detailed analysis of 
state–level data, spanning the last 25 years, which includes 
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the dual recessions of the early 1980s, the 
1990 recession associated with the Gulf 
War, and the recession of 2001 associated 
with the end of the stock market bubble.
Using the information developed in the 
ﬁrst two sections, we develop a stylized 
simulation examining various policies 
that a representative state might have un-
dertaken during the expansion to manage 
its budget in preparation for the economic 
downturn. We focus on how various 
proposed automatic or semi–automatic 
budget rules limiting discretionary tax 
and spending changes might have miti-
gated the problems states are currently 
facing. We conclude with a brief assess-
ment of how well states have managed 
their ﬁscal affairs given the magnitude of 
the downturn and the political constraints 
that they face. 
The aggregate data suggest that the 
states were indeed hit with an unprec-
edented downturn in revenues—unlike 
anything that had been experienced in 
the preceding half–century. Further and 
contrary to general perceptions, revenue 
increases in the years preceding the 
downturn were not particularly strong 
compared to revenue increases in the 
years leading up to previous recessions. 
Not surprisingly, all states were not im-
pacted in the same way during the recent 
recession nor was it the worst recent 
downturn for all states. For some states, 
the dual recessions of the early 1980s were 
associated with larger revenue declines 
(as a share of state income). However, 
relative to the severity of the recession, 
the underperformance of revenues was 
most pronounced in ﬁscal 2002.
Are the states themselves to blame for 
their current situation? The simulation 
analysis seems to exonerate the states, 
suggesting that there was little the states 
could have done, given reasonable ex-
pectations based on past cycles and given 
political constraints that rule out many 
responses. Furthermore, no reasonable 
budget rule could have allowed states to 
navigate the recent ﬂuctuations on auto-
matic pilot.  However, this does not excuse 
what appears to be the slow, temporizing 
response of most states once the magni-
tude of the problems became apparent 
(see Maag and Merriman (2003)).
DATA AND DEFINITIONS
In this paper, we focus on own–source 
general tax revenues. This is the largest 
component of state revenue and has been 
relatively stable at around 76 percent of 
total own–source revenue over the last 
decade.1 And, unlike other state budget 
data, state tax revenue is available for ﬁs-
cal 2003. This provides one and sometimes 
two additional years of crucial data for 
the states compared to other revenue and 
expenditure information. The use of tax 
revenues focuses on the most important 
and most cyclically–sensitive component 
of state ﬁnance. We do not provide here a 
full treatment of the state budget process 
through an examination of both expendi-
tures and revenues.2 However, the analysis 
of revenues makes it possible to evaluate 
options for both revenue enhancements 
and/or expenditure cuts that would help 
bring the budgets into balance. The focus 
on revenue changes highlights the mag-
nitude of the problems states face, but it 
does not shed much light on the resources 
states have to deal with these problems 
or the manner in which the problems are 
resolved. At this stage, most states have 
yet to resolve these issues fully.
A number of studies assessing the 
impact of the recent recessions on state 
finances use combined state and local 
revenues (see Knight, Kusko, and Ru-
 1 The coefﬁcient of correlation between tax revenue and total revenue is .984 for this period.
 2 The analysis is largely descriptive and is not based on a formal model of the budget behavior of the states 
such as Poterba (1994).
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bin (2003), Garret (2003), Daly (2003), 
and The Wall Street Journal (2003)). The 
performance of combined state and local 
revenues often does not provide a good 
picture of either state or local revenues 
because considerable differences exist 
between the behavior of these revenues. 
In particular, local government revenue 
performed much better during the recent 
downturn because of local governments’ 
reliance on the property tax. Property tax 
revenues, the almost exclusive province 
of local governments, increased during 
the economic downturn because of the 
stability of the assessment base as well 
as rate increases. Property taxes in ﬁscal 
years 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 increased 
4.5, 5.3, 10.2 and 1.3 percent respectively. 
The Wall Street Journal (2003), for ex-
ample, recently noted that, “state and 
local receipts have been rising smartly 
for the past six quarters, reaching a new 
quarterly record . . .  .” It uses this evidence 
to argue that state governments are in a 
strong ﬁscal position, and further asserts 
that complaints over state governments’ 
poor ﬁscal health are merely disingenuous 
attempts by those looking for an excuse 
to raise taxes.
The term general revenues as used here 
is a Census Bureau classiﬁcation that in-
cludes all state government activity except 
state–run liquor stores, utilities, and insur-
ance trusts. This is a more comprehensive 
category than the commonly–used gen-
eral fund budget designation. In a typical 
fund accounting framework used in most 
states, general fund activities include most 
core state activities, but exclude major 
functional areas, such as transportation, 
which are segregated in non–general fund 
accounts such as the road fund. Therefore, 
the Census numbers used here do not cor-
respond exactly to the numbers reported 
in most state budgets and in the press nor 
do they relate precisely to the revenues 
used in calculations of state budget deﬁ-
cits or shortfalls. However, the data used 
here are highly correlated with the other 
measures and they are collected using 
a consistent classiﬁcation system that is 
applied to all states.
Because of its inclusiveness, the general 
revenue category used in this analysis is 
likely to be somewhat more stable than 
typical general fund revenues since it 
includes motor fuel taxes and other excise 
taxes. Motor fuel taxes are often levied on 
a unit basis and do not vary as much dur-
ing the business cycle as income tax and 
sales tax receipts.
To deal with population and price 
changes over the time period, tax rev-
enues are measured in per capita, real 
(ﬁscal 2003) dollars. Revenues combine 
both the impacts of the economy and of 
discretionary changes in tax structures. In 
the last ten years, discretionary changes 
have had relatively little impact on state 
revenues.3 
AGGREGATE RESULTS: FIFTY YEARS 
OF STATE REVENUES
Descriptive Analysis 
We now compare the behavior of state 
tax revenues before, during, and after the 
recession of 2001 with other downturns 
over the last 50 years. This is done de-
scriptively with several different charts. 
Figure 1 depicts state tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP from the early 1950s 
until 2003.4 The most striking aspect of 
this chart in not the cyclical behavior of 
 3 See National Governors Association and National Association of State Budget Ofﬁcers (2003). Net enacted changes 
reduced the annual real growth of tax revenues by approximately one percent a year from 1996 to 2001, had virtu-
ally no impact in 2002, and increased revenues by 1.5 percent in 2003. The effects are signiﬁcantly smaller than the 
impacts of changes during the 1980s and early 1990s. “Enacted changes” is a term used by National Association of 
State Budget Ofﬁcers to disentangle changes generated by the economy and discretionary changes in tax laws.
 4 The years referred to throughout this paper regarding revenues and budget issues are ﬁscal years.
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tax revenues, but the marked contrast 
between the ﬁrst and the last half of the 
period. The period before the mid–1970s 
was one of rapid expansion of state gov-
ernment. States during this period were 
expanding their activities on a number 
of fronts, most notably in education. In 
most states, the ﬁnancing of primary and 
secondary education was shifting from 
local governments (school districts) to the 
states. Public higher education, which is 
largely a state function, also expanded 
rapidly during this period. 
This pre–1970 period was also a time of 
change for state tax systems. States had 
moved away from the property tax before 
this period and began to rely more heavily 
on broad general taxes such as the general 
sales tax and eventually, the income tax. In 
1950, the individual income tax accounted 
for less than 10 percent of state tax rev-
enues. By 1975, this ratio had increased to 
about 24 percent.  By 2000, the income tax 
had risen to more than one–third of state 
tax revenues. These increases were the 
result of the adoption of the tax by more 
states and by higher rates imposed with 
existing taxes.
During the four recessions prior to 1973, 
the cyclical impacts of recessions on tax 
revenues were largely swamped by the 
secular ramping up of state tax burdens. 
The only declines in the last 30 years were 
after the 1973, 1980, 1990 and 2001 reces-
sions. The decline after the 2001 recession 
was by far the greatest with state taxes 
falling from 5.7  to 5.1 percent of GDP over 
a two–year period. The other post–1970 
declines were much smaller—around 
one–tenth of one percentage point. With 
the exception of 2001, the declines were 
erased in a year or two by natural revenue 
growth and discretionary increases.
As a percentage of GDP, state taxes 
rose from 3.0 percent in 1950 to 5.5 per-
cent in 1975. Since 1975, state taxes have 
hovered around the 5.5 percent level with 
no signiﬁcant upward trend. It is interest-
ing to note that the rapid growth of state 
tax revenues as well as state and local 
revenues halted several years before the 
widely publicized tax protest movements 
such as Proposition 13 in California and 
Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts in the 
late 1970s as well as the “Reagan revolu-
tion” of the early 1980s.5
Figure 1. State Taxes as Percentage of GDP
 5 State and local taxes as a percentage of GDP reached a peak in 1972 and then fell for several years. The 1972 
peak was not exceeded until the early 1990s.
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Figure 2 conﬁrms the widely publicized 
statement that the ﬁscal problems of the 
states (at least in terms of revenue) are 
the worst since World War II.6  The year 
2002 is the only time when revenues fell 
in current dollar terms. This is the result of 
a combination of the effects of a steep real 
revenue decline along with a historically 
low inﬂation rate.
In the past, states have considered it a 
crisis when revenues did not keep pace 
with inﬂation. Note in Figure 2 that, prior 
to 2001, this was a rare occurrence. During 
the last half of the twentieth century, there 
were only 5 years when real per capita 
state tax revenues fell: the recessions of 
1958, 1974, 1981, 1982, and 1991. In these 
years, the declines were modest: 0.6, 0.9, 
0.7, 0.7, and 0.5 percent respectively. Pre-
viously, the only back–to–back decline in 
state revenues occurred during the double 
dip recessions of the early 1980s. Real rev-
enues actually increased in the recessions 
of 1953, 1960, and 1969. 
Contrast this with the recession of 2001. 
Here real revenues fell by 7.9 percent for 
ﬁscal 2002 followed by another decline 
on a lower base in 2003 of 1.8 percent. 
The ﬁscal 2002 reduction was almost nine 
times as large as the previous worst per-
formance, while 2003 was twice as large as 
any pre–2001 decline. The relative size of 
the 2002 decline was largely the result of 
the economy.  Major tax adjustments are 
usually not accomplished in the ﬁrst year 
of a downturn.  The second–year decline 
in revenue (2003) was the compound ef-
fect of a continued downturn along with 
few states raising taxes to cope with the 
recession. 
Note that the declines for ﬁscal 2002 
and 2003 were in the context of one of 
the mildest recession on record although 
the recovery from the recession has been 
much slower than normal.7 It has been 
suggested that the 2001 recession was a 
throwback to recessions of the nineteenth 
century that resulted from vast overin-
vestment in speciﬁc industries (railroads 
then, telecommunications and informa-
tion technology now). The decline in asset 
values and investment, not employment 
Figure 2. Annual Changes in Per Capita State Taxes: Nominal and Real
 6 While the data are not included, the results discussed here apply to the period 1945–1951 as well.
 7 A 2003 NBER analysis shows that real GDP, retail sales, and industrial product all declined less steeply in the 
2001 recession compared to the average of eight previous recessions, but recovered at a slower rate.  (http://
www.nber.org/cycles/hall.pdf)
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and consumption, characterized the recent 
recession.
It has been alleged that states had an 
unprecedented run up of revenues in the 
period before the downturn in ﬁscal 2002. 
The combination of a booming economy 
and an even more vibrant stock market 
produced revenue windfalls unmatched 
by past experience. A corollary of this is 
the assertion that states mismanaged their 
ﬁnances during the boom period instead 
of taking precautions for the eventual 
downturn.
We examine this issue in Figure 3 and 
Table 1. Figure 3 provides information 
about the two– and four–year cumulative 
per capita tax revenue increases calculated 
on a rolling basis from 1953 to 2003.  Fig-
ure 3 suggests that the years just before the 
2001 recession were certainly productive 
in terms of state revenues, but not out of 
character with previous pre–recession 
expansions. The cumulative two– and 
four–year revenue increase was actually 
lower than most similar previous periods. 
This is presented in more detail in Table 1. 
Here the cumulative four–year pre–reces-
sion increase in real per capita state tax 
revenues and the two–year post–recession 
revenue impacts are presented for the 
nine post–1950 recessions. Note that the 
results of the 1981 recession are hard to 
interpret because that recession occurred 
before a full recovery took place from the 
1980 recession.
Excluding 1981, the four–year revenue 
increase before 2001 was among the low-
est pre–recession periods on record, just 
barely surpassing the pre–1990 revenue 
increase. Note also that the two–year post–
recession decline after the 2001 recession is 
by far the most negative on record, nearly 
three times the next largest percentage 
Figure 3. Cumulative 2–Year and 4–Year Changes in Real Per Capita State Taxes
TABLE 1 
GROWTH OF STATE TAX REVENUES BEFORE  
AND AFTER RECENT RECESSIONS  
(Real Per Capita)
July 1953(II)    20.8     3.8
August 1957(III)    19.3    –0.5
April 1960(II)    13.7     7.6
December 1969(IV)    36.2     8.9
November 1973(IV)    28.3     0.4
January 1980(I)    12.9    –2.7
July 1981(III)     5.2    –3.3
July 1990(III)    12.4    –1.1
March 2001(I)    12.5    –9.6
Recession
(Beginning Quarter)
Previous 4 
Years (%)
Next 2 
Years (%)
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decrease. While the causes of the decline 
in revenues––in many states for a second 
straight year (ﬁscal 2003)––are not fully 
understood, part of the reductions are the 
result of the major decline in ﬁnancial as-
set values that continued during calendar 
2002 after the recession had technically 
ended.  It may also have resulted because 
income declines were disproportionately 
large for very high income taxpayers (with 
reductions in bonuses and stock options). 
To the extent that state income taxes are 
progressive, such changes have a larger 
impact on tax revenues. 
Part of the perception about rapid rev-
enue growth in the 1990s may have been 
generated by other factors. In addition to 
fairly rapid growth, states were experienc-
ing windfall revenue gains and windfall 
surpluses. The unexpected gains occurred 
because state revenue growth was sys-
tematically underestimated each year 
during this period as was the case with 
federal revenues. The tobacco settlement 
funds also added to the state revenues. In 
addition, expenditure demands were less 
pressing as compared to prior experience. 
For example, medical care inﬂation abated 
during the latter part of the 1990s. States 
with their heavy Medicaid burdens had 
become accustomed to double–digit cost 
increases and were pleasantly surprised 
when costs went up less steeply. Welfare 
roles also declined during the post–1996 
welfare reform period. Even the cost of 
pensions became less onerous because 
the rapid increase in equity values had a 
dramatic impact on pension fund assets, 
thus reducing pension funding obliga-
tions. Some states were able to reduce or 
eliminate pension fund contributions dur-
ing this period because stock market gains 
took care of their obligations. Together the 
unexpected revenue growth along with 
a surprising moderation in expenditure 
demands created what one might call a 
golden era for state ﬁnance.
In summary, the descriptive results sug-
gest a decline in state revenues after the 
2001 recession that is unmatched in the 
last 50 years. Further, the decline is not 
the result of an anomalous pre–recession 
revenue growth that led to the ultimate 
decline.  
Analytical Results
In this section, we employ a time–series 
econometric model to explain state rev-
enue performance. Our dependent vari-
able is the annual change in real per capita 
state tax revenue.  Our three explanatory 
variables are the annual change in real per 
capita income, the percentage of state tax 
revenue from the individual income tax, 
and the annual percentage change in the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). The 
results are presented in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
PER CAPITA CHANGE IN REAL STATE TAX REVENUES
Model 1CVariable Model 1A Model 1B
t–values in parentheses
Percentage change in real income
Percentage of revenue from income tax
Percentage change in DJIA
Constant
R–square
1.058352
(5.62)
–0.002573
(–0.34)
0.39
1.000859
(5.65)
–0.130401
(–2.86)
0.030134
(2.24)
0.48
1.093540
(6.26)
–0.132612
(–3.03)
0.058754
(2.27)
0.022914
(1.73)
0.53
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Model lA estimates revenue changes 
based solely on income changes, Model 1B 
is based on income changes and income tax 
reliance, and Model 1C employs all three 
explanatory variables. The variables are 
signiﬁcant in each of the formulations. The 
models explain from 39 to 53 percent of the 
variation. The change in income variable 
is highly signiﬁcant in all three models. 
Both change of income and change in the 
DJIA have the expected sign. The income 
tax reliance variable has a negative sign 
suggesting that increased reliance on the 
income tax provides stability (i. e., reduces 
the expected change in tax revenues), a 
seemingly counterintuitive result. An al-
ternative explanation is that the income tax 
reliance variable may be serving as a proxy 
for time since reliance increased fairly 
steadily over the period of the analysis 
while overall volatility declined. 
The inﬂation rate was also included 
as an explanatory variable, but it did not 
prove signiﬁcant and did not add to the 
explanatory power of the analysis. Since 
the analysis is conducted using real val-
ues, the direct impact of the inﬂation rate 
is accounted for. However, the tax system 
could have non–neutralities with respect 
to inﬂation such as “bracket creep” for 
the income tax or the erosion of revenues 
for speciﬁc excise taxes such as those im-
posed on gasoline, alcohol, and tobacco. 
These effects do not appear to have been 
signiﬁcant.8
The results of the estimates were used 
to produce residuals for each year for each 
equation. These results are presented in 
Figure 4, Panels 1, 2, & 3. The residuals 
suggest that the explanatory variables 
do not fully explain the decrease in rev-
enue after the 2001 recession. The results 
indicate that revenues behaved in a very 
unusual manner during and after the 2001 
recession. The residuals can be thought 
of as revenue shortfalls that state expe-
rienced compared to reasonable expecta-
tions. The negative residuals for 2002 are 
the largest of any of the 51 years in the 
series. The residuals for 2001 and 2003 are 
also very large and negative. This is true 
for all three formulations. 
A similar phenomenon occurred at the 
federal level where there was an unex-
pected and largely unexplained reduction 
in federal tax revenues.9 The revenue de-
cline after the 2001 recession is at least a 
“50–year” ﬂood, a virtually one–of–a–kind 
event. In a sense, the unexpected and not 
fully explained decline in revenues after 
the 2001 recession is a kind of apology for 
state ﬁscal behavior. It may explain why 
states were not better prepared for the 
downturn and why their initial responses 
to the problems were often weak given the 
magnitude of the problem. 
Except for 2000, these results also 
conﬁrm the observation that the revenue 
growth in the years leading up to the 2001 
recession was not unusually strong. The 
residuals in all three speciﬁcations from 
1996 to 1999 were either negative or very 
small positive values. The implications of 
these results for state budget policy are 
explored below.
STATE–LEVEL REVENUE RESULTS
The analysis of state tax revenues in ag-
gregate may mask variations in revenue 
 8 On the expenditure side of the ﬁscal equation, high inﬂation rates may ease some budget problems. For example, 
it is much easier for a state to provide nominal wage and salary increases several percentage points below the 
inﬂation rate in a high–inﬂation environment. This is not possible when the inﬂation rate is near zero.
 9 In this regard, the 2003 Economic Report of the President states, “The decline in receipts during the most recent 
downturn in the business cycle has been especially pronounced. Total receipts in ﬁscal 2002 were $1,853 billion, 
having fallen $138 billion, or about 7 percent, from their level in ﬁscal 2001. This represented a much larger 
percentage decrease in receipts than in previous, far more severe recessions. … More detailed information 
on the precise sources of the decline in receipts will not be available until the Treasury completes its regular 
annual examination of individual tax returns.”
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Figure 4. Unexplained Variations in Real Per Capita State Tax Revenues
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performance among the states. In this 
section, we conduct a similar analysis to 
that in the preceding section, but based on 
state–level revenues spanning from 1977 
to 2002.10 Figure 5 presents information 
about the nominal change in tax revenue 
for 2002 over 2001. Thirty–nine states suf-
fered nominal declines in revenue. Fiscal 
2002 was the worst real revenue perfor-
mance for 28 states for the 1977–2002 
period—the result of the combination 
of a real decline and a historically low 
rate of inﬂation. The poor performance 
in the early 1980s was masked by high 
inﬂation.
Table 3 and Figure 6 present similar 
information in real terms. Forty–two 
of the 50 states suffered real declines in 
revenue. Seven states had double digit 
declines including California’s 15 percent. 
However, 2002, while still the worst year 
since 1977 in real terms for a plurality of 
states, does not appear as bad in relative 
terms. (See Figure 7.)  The years 1981 and 
1982 were also very bad for a number of 
states, especially in the Midwest which 
suffered the brunt of the 1980 and 1981 
recessions.
Tax revenue performance by region for 
2001 and 2002 is presented in Figure 8. 
The results show that revenue problems 
arrived early (2001) in the Great Lakes 
and were extremely severe in the Far 
West (with California, Alaska, and Oregon 
being three of the four worst performing 
states) and New England in 2002.
To determine how states performed 
relative to expectations, we carry out an 
analysis related to the work above, but 
using panel data from the 50 states. (See 
the Appendix for a fuller description of the 
approach.) The results presented here are 
based on a model that includes only state 
personal income and state ﬁxed effects as 
the explanatory variables.11 
The difference between the actual and 
predicted tax revenues is derived for each 
state and each year.12 To normalize this 
Figure 5. Percentage Change in Nominal State Tax Revenues: 2002
10  The data include both the impacts of the economy as well as “enacted changes.” Overall, the impact of enacted 
changes was very small in recent years. See footnote 3 and Maag and Merriman (2003). However, the impacts 
of enacted changes may be more substantial for particular states. 
11 We also explored other speciﬁcations that included information on state employment and states’ reliance on 
the personal income tax. Results from these speciﬁcations were very similar to those from the model that only 
included personal income.
12 An alternative way of addressing underperformance would have been to include a year dummy in the analysis. 
When this was done, the size of the 2002 dummy was strongly negative for almost all states.
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residual, it is divided by the actual state 
revenue. Figure 9 presents the results 
of this analysis of underperformance. 
The results are similar, but not identical 
to those presented earlier with Alaska, 
California, and Oregon faring very poorly. 
Tax revenues in 48 of the 50 states under-
performed in 2002 in the sense that actual 
revenues fell short of predicted levels that 
included the impacts of changes in state 
personal income.
Figure 10 shows that 2002 was the 
worst year for underperformance in 
14 states during the 1977–2002 period, 
more states than in any other year. How-
ever, a number of states experienced their 
worst years in the recessions of 1980 and 
1981.
TABLE 3 
% CHANGE IN REAL STATE TAX REVENUES: 2002
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Alaska
California
Massachusetts
Oregon
Idaho
South Carolina
New Mexico
Connecticut
Colorado
Rhode Island
New Jersey
U. S.
Oklahoma
Minnesota
Georgia
North Dakota
Utah
Kansas
New York
Montana
Tennessee
Illinois
Iowa
Wyoming
Texas
Hawaii
–24.6
–15.0
–14.9
–13.8
–12.2
–11.4
–10.4
 –9.7
 –9.5
 –6.4
 –5.9
 –5.8
 –5.6
 –5.5
 –5.2
 –5.1
 –4.7
 –4.7
 –4.6
 –4.6
 –4.1
 –4.1
 –4.0
 –3.7
 –3.7
 –3.6
 
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
Virginia
Pennsylvania
Michigan
Missouri
Maine
Nebraska
Vermont
Indiana
Florida
Mississippi
North Carolina
Washington
South Dakota
Ohio
Maryland
Wisconsin
Arkansas
Arizona
Kentucky
Alabama
Louisiana
Nevada
Delaware
West Virginia
New Hampshire
–3.4
 –3.0
 –2.9
 –2.9
 –2.7
 –2.6
 –2.3
 –2.3
 –1.6
 –1.5
 –1.5
 –1.5
 –1.2
 –1.1
 –0.8
 –0.7
 –0.2
  0.3
  0.4
  0.8
  0.9
  1.8
  2.1
  2.6
  6.1
Figure 6. Percentage Change in Real State Tax Revenues: 2002
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Figure 7. Year of Worst Real Revenue Performance
Figure 8. Tax Revenue Performance by Region: 2001 and 2002
Figure 9. Underperformance of Revenue (Residuals as Percentage of Actual): 2002
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The various panels of Figure 11 present 
information about underperformance 
for a number of key states.13 California 
is presented because of its importance as 
the most populace state and the one with 
a large and highly visible ﬁscal problem. 
The analysis certainly conﬁrms the promi-
nent role that the state of California has 
played in the state ﬁscal crisis debate.14 
Colorado has sometimes been put for-
ward as an example of ﬁscal prudence 
stemming from its state–level spending 
limits. The results here, though, show 
that spending limits do not protect states 
against revenue declines and underper-
formance.
Illinois and Michigan both experienced 
underperformance in 2001 as well as 2002. 
Both states experienced larger relative 
underperformance in the 1980 recession 
than in 2002. Massachusetts, like Califor-
nia, had a relative good performance in 
2001 followed by a major decline in 2002. 
New York had a similar, but milder pat-
tern of underperformance. With neither 
a broad–based income tax nor a general 
sales tax, New Hampshire was one of the 
few states that avoided most of the ﬁscal 
pain of the downturn.
In this section, we focused on the perfor-
mance of state–level tax revenues. Under-
performance of revenues is not necessarily 
a measure of ﬁscal crisis, but it suggests 
the magnitude of the problems that must 
be addressed. The use of budget reserves, 
expenditure reductions, and tax increases 
can all be used to address the problems 
generated by revenue shortfalls.
AN EVALUATION OF STRATEGIES TO 
PREPARE FOR THE DOWNTURN
We address here the question of how 
states could have prepared for the down-
turn. We use a stylized simulation of state 
revenue and expenditure growth that in-
corporates reasonable assumptions about 
revenue growth over the period from 1993 
to 2003. Much of the debate centers on 
what the states could have done prior to 
Figure 10. Year of Worst Underperformance of Revenue
13 Alaska, the worst performing state, is not included because of the unusual nature of its revenues system with 
the heavy reliance on natural resource revenues.
14 Despite California’s large size and serious revenue problems, the state does not drive the national results. The 
estimates were carried out with and without the state of California. We produced estimates that indicate that 
the overall state revenue pattern does not change substantially when California data are excluded.
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Figure 11. Revenue Underperformance in Selected States (Residuals as Percentage of Actual)
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Figure 11 (continued). Revenue Underperformance in Selected States (Residuals as Percentage of Actual)
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the recession to avoid the problems that 
occurred in 2002 and after. The debate has 
focused on the possible use of relatively 
inﬂexible taxing, spending, and/or saving 
rules that could be put in place to avoid 
problems. These place a premium on the 
avoidance of discretionary tax and expen-
diture changes to address the problem. 
The stated goal of most proponents of 
budget rules is to provide ﬁscal stability 
and discipline over the business cycle. 
However, it is suggested below that a 
number of other goals also inﬂuence the 
choice of these rules.
A substantial body of technical lit-
erature addresses the issue of fixed 
rules versus discretion in intertemporal 
consumption–saving decisionmaking.15 
Much of this analysis applies to fiscal 
choices as well. The use of commitment 
strategies such as balanced budget rules, 
mandatory rainy day funds, and tax 
and/or expenditure growth limits are 
often proposed by both liberals and con-
servatives to improve ﬁscal discipline. 
Obviously, each interest group wants a 
commitment rule that favors its particular 
interests.  Fixed rules may be even more 
important for governments as opposed to 
individuals because such rules may limit 
rent–seeking behavior in the ﬁght over 
ﬁscal spoils. On the other hand, rules that 
preserve discipline may also reduce ﬂex-
ibility to make adjustments resulting from 
shocks or new information. The trade–off 
between the two and the question of when 
to depart from predetermined rules is the 
key issue.
A series of simulations (in real terms) 
are presented for the period 1994 until 
2003. It is assumed that revenues equal 
expenditures in 1993 (after the recovery 
from the 1990 recession) and that there 
are no excess reserves at that date. In each 
simulation, revenues are assumed to grow 
at the lesser of the actual rate of increase or 
at the limit set by particular budget rules. 
Expenditures grow at a predetermined 
rate according to the decision rule in place. 
The simulations are used to examine four 
different scenarios:16
1. The “What, me worry?” option 
where expenditures are allowed to 
grow at the same rate (3.95 percent) 
as revenues grew from 1993 to 
2001.
2. A cyclically–balanced budget where 
revenues are equal to expenditures 
over the 1993 to 2003 period. This 
would entail expenditure growth of 
3.6 percent per year.
3. A constrained revenue growth 
scenario where expenditures are 
allowed to grow at the rate (2.3 
percent) that revenues grew from 
1993 to 2003, two years beyond the 
period in scenario 1. Under this 
scenario, taxes are not permanently 
reduced even though expenditures 
are restrained.
4. A permanent tax cut scenario where 
revenue increases are limited to 
the lesser of two percent or the ac-
tual increase. When tax revenues are 
poised to increase by more than two 
percent, taxes are permanently cut to 
limit the increase to two percent.
The “What, me worry?” strategy is, in 
a sense, a straw man where state govern-
ments spend all of their tax revenue on 
recurring expenditures during the expan-
sion. No surpluses are generated during 
good times to offset future downturns. 
While this is an extreme example, it ap-
proximates the behavior of a number of 
states. Simulation 1 (Figure 12) illustrates 
the results of this strategy where revenues 
and expenditures are in rough balance 
15 This is summarized in Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (2003).
16 All of these scenarios assume of a level of knowledge about future revenue growth that is not available to 
actual decision makers.
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until the bottom drops out in 2002 when 
a massive deﬁcit results with even worse 
problems in 2003. The top panel of each 
simulation shows the yearly revenues 
and expenditures while the lower panel 
displays the annual surplus (deﬁcit) and 
the cumulative surpluses (deﬁcits).
In this simulation, the 2002 and 2003 
results are unsustainable, and thus discre-
tionary changes (increased taxes and/or 
decreased spending) would have to be 
implemented. Obviously this rule will 
not fulﬁll the goal of avoiding the need 
for discretionary changes.
Simulation 2 (Figure 13) implements 
a cyclically–balanced budget over the 
1993–2002 period. Surpluses are gener-
ated during the period from 1994 to 2001 
to offset the shortfall during the recession. 
This supports a consistent growth in gov-
ernment spending that is not impacted by 
the cycle. The problem with this scenario 
is that the world does not end in 2003. 
Even though the budget is balanced over 
the period from 1993 to 2003, the existing 
revenue structure for 2004 and future 
years will fall far short (in the 10 percent 
range) of covering expenditure demands 
even assuming a resumption of normal 
economic growth. The precipitous reduc-
tion in revenues in 2002 with no recovery 
in 2003 results in a ratcheting down of the 
revenue baseline so that it will no longer 
support the predetermined expenditure 
path, necessitating discretionary tax or 
spending changes to put the state back 
on track. 
The practices in most states during the 
expansion of the 1990s were a hybrid of 
scenarios 1 and 2. States did not spend 
Figure 12. Simulation 1: “What, me worry?” Scenario
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every penny of increasing revenues, but 
they also fell short of accumulating re-
serves sufﬁcient for a cyclically–balanced 
budget. Clearly the cyclically–balanced 
budget approach is a much more stable 
rule than scenario 1, but is does not avoid 
the need for discretionary changes.
The constrained expenditure growth 
scenario is the only one that could provide 
stability over the cyclic, but it would come 
at the cost of greatly repressed spending. 
In Simulation 3 (Figure 14), annual spend-
ing would be limited to the growth rate of 
revenues from 1993 to 2003 (2.3 percent) 
even though actual revenue growth 
would far exceed expenditure growth in 
many years. This extra revenue could not 
be returned to the taxpayers in terms of 
permanent tax cuts, but it could be used 
for one–time spending programs (such as 
debt retirement) or one–time tax cuts. This 
would maintain the tax base while not 
expanding the spending base. This would 
be a substantial political challenge in most 
states. In 2003, actual revenues would 
match the expenditures although expen-
ditures would be more than 10 percent 
below the balanced budget scenario.
The ﬁnal scenario (Simulation 4 shown 
in Figure 15) involves making permanent 
tax cuts to dissipate rapidly expanding 
revenues. Here expenditures are allowed 
to grow at only two percent while any 
revenue increases over two percent trig-
ger permanent tax cuts to hold revenue 
growth to the same pace. This approach 
would indeed keep expenditures under 
control, but it would not protect against 
economic downturns. Under this scenario, 
the economic downturn in 2002 would 
reduce revenues by the same percent-
age (on a smaller base) as in the other 
Figure 13. Simulation 2: Cyclically Balanced Budget Scenario
Forum on State and Local Fiscal Crises
129
scenarios and create shortfalls as large 
(as a percentage of revenues) as the other 
approaches. Note the results for Colorado 
presented earlier. Colorado has what ap-
pear to be effective controls on expendi-
ture growth, but this did not protect the 
state against major revenue reductions 
in 2002. Colorado ranked ninth in terms 
of the largest fall in real revenues and in 
terms of underperformance in 2002. This 
strategy may be a way of controlling the 
growth of government, but it does not 
provide stability over the cycle.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
States have been roundly criticized from 
both the left and right for their handling 
of the pre–recession growth period of the 
late 1990s. Conservatives have argued that 
budget restraint and tax cuts during this 
expansion phase could have avoided most 
of the pain of the downturn.  Liberals have 
faulted the states for not ﬁnding ways, 
such as the creation of large rainy–day 
fund balances, to protect key spending 
programs in the downturn. 
In the analysis presented here, we 
suggest that neither of these views is cor-
rect.  First, the downturn after 2001 was 
clearly a one–of–a–kind phenomenon in 
its impact on state government tax rev-
enues. The absolute decline in revenues 
was unprecedented and the decline was 
disproportionately large compared to the 
size of the economic downturn. Budget 
ofﬁcers and politicians cannot be reason-
ably faulted for being unprepared for the 
decline in revenues that occurred in 2002 
and 2003.
Figure 14. Simulation 3: Constrained Expenditure Growth Scenario
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Further, even if the dimensions of the 
downturn had been foreseen, it is unlikely 
that the commonly proposed strategies 
would have been effective in avoiding the 
need for major discretionary corrective 
measures to deal with ﬁscal problems in 
most states. In an average state, a rainy–
day fund of ﬁve percent of revenues at the 
beginning of 2002 would have been dissi-
pated the ﬁrst year of the downturn leaving 
a huge gap between actual revenues and 
desired spending for 2003 and future years. 
Similarly, permanent tax cuts enacted dur-
ing the expansion of the late 1990s would 
have lowered the tax base, but it would 
not have protected this lower base from 
the precipitous revenue declines after 2001, 
leaving a huge revenue shortfall. 
Even infusions of temporary federal aid 
as advocated by some analysts would have 
been inadequate as well. The problem 
that began after 2001 should be thought 
of not as the usual cyclical decline in rev-
enues followed by a gradual recovery to 
pre–recession levels. Instead, it is more of 
a one–time, permanent ratcheting down 
of revenues to a lower base from which 
future revenues will grow. Economic 
growth is unlikely to ever return revenues 
to the old growth path. In such a case, it 
is necessary to make permanent structural 
adjustments to revenues or expenditures 
to bring them into balance again. No auto-
matic budget rule is likely to do this.
Obviously, rainy day funds, federal aid, 
and the like are extremely valuable tools 
during a downturn. However, in a major 
disruption , they should not be viewed as 
mechanisms for avoiding painful choices, 
but as tools for making adjustments more 
manageable. It appears, however, that in 
many states the use of reserve funds as 
Figure 15. Simulation 4: Permanent Tax Cuts Scenario
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well as temporary expedients such as the 
sale of assets and borrowing to fund cur-
rent expenditures have been employed 
not to smooth the transition to a new 
long run equilibrium, but, instead, to put 
off the day of reckoning when the hard 
choices have to be made (see Maag and 
Merriman (2003)).
It should also be noted that the well–
known problems with the structure of 
state tax systems, such as the failure to 
tax services under the sales tax, problems 
taxing e–commerce, and the shrinking of 
the corporate base, were not the cause 
of the states’ recent problems. In fact, 
many of longstanding proposals for 
state tax reform would have had little 
impact on protecting states from the 
consequences of the recent downturn 
and, in some cases, may have actu-
ally made matters worse. For example, 
one of the goals of state tax reform has 
been to make tax revenues more responsive 
to economic growth to keep pace better 
with the rate of growth of expenditure de-
mands. Increasing the progressivity of the 
income tax and the inclusion of services 
in the sales tax base are examples of such 
policies.17 While these may be worthy 
ideas, had such changes been in place the 
problems of the downturn would very 
likely have been more, not less severe. 
States also are searching for ways to re-
verse the erosion of the corporate income 
tax base. However, a greater reliance on 
the corporate income tax increases the 
volatility of state tax systems and would 
have worsened the ﬁscal problems of the 
states during the recent downturn. Finally, 
the longstanding movement away from 
local property taxes to state–level taxes 
accentuated the problems of state and 
local governments since the property tax 
weathered the recession much better than 
the income and sales taxes.18
Why is such importance placed on 
inﬂexible budget rules by both liberals 
and conservatives? The ostensive goal 
of both is to provide ﬁscal stability over 
the business cycle. However, these rules 
may also be vehicles to pursue other 
goals. For example, the prime purpose of 
expenditure growth limitations for con-
servatives is not to provide stability, but 
to reduce the relative size of government. 
Similarly, rules that funnel revenues into 
budget stabilization funds also may be 
a way of protecting the tax base against 
permanent tax cuts during expansions. 
Even proponents of temporary federal aid 
to states may be primarily interested in the 
macro goal of neutralizing the potentially 
pro–cyclical impacts of state tax increases 
or expenditure cuts, and not the goal of 
state budget stability.
In summary, the size and unusual 
nature of the recent downturn in state 
revenues will require major discretion-
ary structural changes in state revenues 
and expenditures to bring states back 
into fiscal balance. Reactive policies 
that may have been effective in the 
past, such as waiting for economic 
growth to solve the problems, will not be 
sufﬁcient. 
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APPENDIX
The state–level data on revenue are from the 
Census Bureau and cover years 1977 through 
2002. Annual data for state personal income 
are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and 
cover the same period.  The following equation 
relates total annual state taxes to state personal 
income and state ﬁxed effects:
tax_revenuei,t = β . personal_incomei,t 
 + state_dummies . γi + εi,t = αi + β 
 . personal_incomei,t + εi,t ,
where i denotes the state and t the year of the 
observation. Thus, tax_revenueit represents total 
taxes for state i in year t. 
Because tax revenue and personal income 
are nonstationary (i.e., means and variances are 
not constant over time), logged differences (i.e., 
growth rates) are estimated instead of levels. 
Thus, the estimating equation becomes:
 
        tax_revenuei,trev_growthi,t = ln(———————)= β 
        
tax_revenuei,t–1
    personal_inci,t
 
. ln(———————) + state_dummiesi,t . γi + εi,t.
   
personal_inci,t–1
The estimated parameters are then used to 
generate predicted revenue growth rates for 
1978 through 2002. Next, the predicted growth 
rates are used to calculate predicted state tax 
revenue, using actual tax revenue in 1977 as the 
base. Thus, for a given year, t-, state i’s predicted 
tax revenue can be expressed such that,
  
ˆ    
t=t
– 
    ˆtax_revenuei,t = [Π(1 + rev_growthi,t)] 
     
t=1978
 . tax_revenuei,1977 .
